OPORA Demonstrates the Arithmetic of Vote Rigging
The election watchdog OPORA has shown by means of “simple calculations” that the process for issue of ballot papers and vote count in the 28 October parliamentary elections was distorted”.
In some election districts the number of voters at close of voting on Election Day was between one and two thousand different from when the polling stations opened. Moreover, the figure could be less at close of voting, indicating that large numbers of votes had disappeared, or higher, with voters (or “votes”) mysteriously appearing.
These differences are despite the fact that 25 October was the final day on which voters could complain if their names were not on the voter list. And that on Election Day itself the head, deputy head or secretary of a precinct electoral commission [PEC] were only allowed to correct inaccuracies in spelling etc if it was clear that the person who had appeared really was on the list.
OPORA also points out that the numbers also clash with those included on the vote count protocols for each PEC. Data is sent to the Central Election Commission server from each district electoral commission [DEC] as soon as the protocols are received from PEC.
OPORA gives the following examples.
Election District No.
No. of voters on the voter list at 8.00
No. of voters on the voter list at the end of voting (20:00)
No. of voters who had received ballot papers by the end of voting (20.00)
No. of voters on the voter list according to vote count protocols
The difference between the no. of voters at 8.00 and at 20.00
19 (Volyn oblast)
99 (Kirovohrad oblast)
120 (Lviv oblast)
177 (Kharkiv oblast)
198 (Cherkasy oblast)
The OPORA report was compiled by Natalia Radysh, OPERA observer in the Lviv oblast