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The claim that the Russian-Ukrainian war has changed its nature is now voiced not by outside analysts but by the people who have commanded that war. As early as November 2023, while still Commander-in-Chief, Valerii Zaluzhnyi published in The Economist an essay on modern positional warfare, in which he explicitly compared the front to the First World War: the level of technology achieved had driven both armies into a stalemate, and there was no prospect of a deep breakthrough. As former Commander-in-Chief, he developed this idea in his column ‘Politics and War. Reality versus Expectations’ (Liga.net, November 2025). In his words, what is at stake is a contest of endurance for the entire organism of the state, simultaneously in its military, social and economic dimensions.
He gave his definitive formulation in 2026 in a column for The Telegraph. ‘This is no longer a war of rapid manoeuvre. This is a war of attrition,’ writes Zaluzhnyi. The saturation of the front with drones, precision weapons and surveillance assets has made large breakthroughs almost impossible for both sides. The enemy is now betting not on a swift offensive but on exhausting Ukraine economically, militarily and psychologically.
Hence the warning: it would be a mistake to interpret strikes on Russian logistics and infrastructure as a sign that the end is near. In a war of attrition there is no obvious victor in the usual sense. Its outcome is decided by endurance, that is, by a society's ability to bear the burden of a protracted conflict for longer while retaining external support.
Oleksandr Syrskyi, who has headed the Armed Forces of Ukraine since February 2024, reached the same conclusion. Back in May 2025, at a meeting of the Ukraine–NATO Council, he stated that the enemy had turned its aggression against Ukraine into a war of attrition. And in May 2026 he acknowledged the other side of this situation: with limited resources and the enemy's numerical superiority, the Armed Forces of Ukraine ‘are trying to move from a “war of attrition” to an asymmetric strategy’, that is, to strikes on the enemy's rear and a reliance on unmanned systems.
Tellingly, the very attempt to break out of mutual attrition is the best confirmation of the diagnosis. The war has long been fought not over territory but over reserves of patience.
What a war of attrition is
It is the opposite of a ‘strategy of annihilation’, in which everything is decided by a decisive battle. Victory is achieved not by routing the enemy's army but by exhausting its capacity and willingness to fight: people, money, shells, allies, the patience of the home front.
Such wars arise when:
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the sides are roughly equal technologically and neither can achieve a breakthrough;
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defence is cheaper and more effective than offence;
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the front is continuous, there are no flanks, and manoeuvre operations are ineffective;
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both sides have mobilisation depth and external supply.
The key paradox is that losses in personnel and equipment lose their significance in themselves. What matters is something else: the ratio of losses to the capacity to replace them, and society's threshold of tolerance for the cost. That is why such wars usually end not in military defeat but in the internal collapse of one of the sides, or in negotiations.
Classic examples
The American Civil War (1864–1865), the first industrial war of attrition. Grant abandoned manoeuvre and accepted an exchange of losses, knowing that the South could not replace its own. Meanwhile, Sherman was destroying the enemy's economic base.
The First World War, Western Front (1915–1918), the textbook case. At Verdun, Falkenhayn stated his aim plainly: to bleed the French army white, not to take the city. Germany was ultimately broken not by an Entente victory on the battlefield but by naval blockade, hunger and revolution.
The Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988): eight years of trenches, chemical weapons, the ‘war of the cities’ and attacks on tankers. It ended in a draw on the pre-war borders; both sides had simply run out of breath.
Vietnam (1965–1973), attrition in reverse. The United States was winning on the ‘body count’, but the resource that ran out turned out to be Washington's political will, not Hanoi's manpower.
Several conclusions follow from this:
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tactical successes almost never translate into strategic results, and this is precisely what Zaluzhnyi warns about;
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the outcome is decided by the economy, demography and the durability of external support, not by the map of the front;
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a way out of attrition comes from a technological leap, from shifting the blow onto the enemy's economy, or from coalition asymmetry;
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such a war more often ends with a political event (regime change, revolution, the exhaustion of an external donor) than with capitulation at the front.
How the internal order of the belligerents affects the outcome
The decisive variable here is not the quantity of resources but the state's capacity to extract them and to sustain the will to continue. There are only two mechanisms: coercion and consent. Both work, but they differ in resilience.
Autocracy buys endurance through repression. There is no electoral deadline; losses can be concealed and protests suppressed. The price of this choice is distorted information at the top, the absence of feedback that corrects bad strategy, and the general fragility of the structure. Such systems hold out for a long time but collapse suddenly and completely (Russia in 1917, Germany in 1918).
Democracy buys endurance through legitimacy. People mobilise more willingly, pay taxes more conscientiously, mistakes are discussed and corrected, and credit and allies are more accessible. The price is vulnerability to war-weariness, electoral cycles and elite splits.
The academic literature of the last century is divided on this. Dan Reiter and Allan Stam showed that democracies' armies fight more effectively. They have noticeably better initiative and quality of leadership and somewhat better logistics, yet all three advantages diminish as a war drags on (‘Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1998; developed in the book Democracies at War, Princeton UP, 2002). Scott Bennett and Allan Stam put it even more starkly. According to data on interstate wars from 1816 to 1990, democracies win short wars more often, but autocracies are far less likely to give up as time goes on. After roughly eighteen months, the advantage passes to the autocrat, while democracies become more inclined to exit the war and accept a draw or defeat (‘The Declining Advantages of Democracy’, JCR 42(3), 1998). A caveat: these are statistics from the last century and cannot be used to forecast a modern war.
Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver and Jason Reifler refine the mechanism. A society's tolerance for casualties is determined not by their number but by two beliefs: that the cause is just and that success is attainable. A society can accept both an unfinished war and rising costs until events convince it that victory is impossible (‘Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq’, International Security 30(3), 2005/06; the book Paying the Human Costs of War, Princeton UP, 2009). That is precisely why a defensive war for survival gives a democracy an enormous margin of resilience (Britain in 1940, Finland in 1939–1940), while an expeditionary war gives it almost none (Vietnam).
How this maps onto the aspects of the war outlined above
Losses and the threshold of tolerance. This is the direct channel of influence. The threshold depends not on absolute figures but on the sense that the costs are fairly shared. If mobilisation is perceived as fairly distributed rather than as a tax on the poor and the unprivileged, the threshold is high. Corruption in the Territorial Recruitment Centres, bribes to buy one's way out, and an indefinite term of service without rotation or demobilisation hit this threshold harder than the losses themselves. Draft evasion and desertion belong here too. They are indicators not of cowardice but of the devaluation of the contract between the state and the mobilised.
Converting tactics into strategy. Here the quality of command matters. Where bad news is punished, reports are embellished and decisions are made on the basis of a false picture. Press freedom and effective parliamentary oversight are politically inconvenient, but functionally they are an early warning system. Scandals surrounding individual units or failed operations act as a corrective mechanism; a closed system simply has no such mechanism.
The economy, demography and external support. This is the most sensitive point. The rule of law here is not an abstraction but part of combat power: corruption in defence procurement means shells and drones that physically never arrive. In a protracted war, demography depends on whether refugees return, and that is a question of trust in institutions, not in the front line. External support, in turn, is directly conditioned by reputation. Aid, loans and integration prospects are tied to the state of human rights and anti-corruption institutions, and this is the only resource in a war of attrition that can be lost not at the front but in an ally's parliament.
Breaking out of attrition. Technological leaps and asymmetric solutions are born from below: through initiative, horizontal links, private engineering and a willingness to tolerate failed experiments. A centralised hierarchy is better at scaling what has already been found but worse at finding new solutions. An open society has a structural advantage here in the pace of adaptation, provided that the state does not suppress grassroots initiative or monopolise production.
Political termination. This holds the main risk for democracy. Postponed elections and martial law gradually erode the legitimacy of those in power, yet elections in the middle of a war create a risk of division and foreign interference. A side effect is heightened tension between the political and military leadership: a general with high ratings becomes a political factor, and this distracts the chain of command from combat tasks. Public disputes between former and current commanders-in-chief and ministers on the one hand and the political leadership on the other are a symptom of exactly this problem. Moreover, any negotiations require a party whose signature society recognises, and a deficit of legitimacy can make peace politically unsignable even when there is readiness for it.
The key asymmetry
Repression and legitimacy yield endurance of different quality. The former allows a state to hold out longer; the latter allows it to fight better. In a long war, this means different types of defeat: a closed system risks sudden political collapse, an open one a gradual slide towards ‘peace out of exhaustion’. They also share a common scenario of degradation. A democracy that curtails rights and accountability for the sake of survival loses its own advantages and acquires the enemy's vulnerabilities, without gaining its instruments of coercion.
What is meant by victory
‘Victory’ here is not one concept but three different ones.
Maximalist: the military liberation of all territories within the 1991 borders, reparations, and trials of those responsible. In light of everything discussed above, and given the current balance of forces, this goal is practically unattainable by military means. The positional stalemate Zaluzhnyi writes about is symmetrical: if a breakthrough is impossible for the side with superiority in manpower and firepower, it is all the more impossible for the side without it.
Realistic: preserving Ukraine as a sovereign, viable, armed and Western-integrated state; freezing the war along a line that Ukraine does not recognise legally but that the enemy cannot shift; and security guarantees that make a renewed attack too costly. This is achievable, and it is the scenario analysts lean towards.
Minimal: preserving statehood as such. Today this is no longer in question, but in the very long term it is not automatically guaranteed.
The realistic scenario requires four conditions at once:
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resilient air defence and protection of the energy system;
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restored trust of the mobilised in the state, that is, rotation, clear terms of service and fairness in sharing the burden;
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financial autonomy from allies' political cycles, that is, European money and frozen assets instead of annual bargaining in Washington;
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maintaining the pace of technological adaptation.
If even one of these pillars sags for a prolonged period, the realistic scenario slides towards the minimal one.
Resources and constraints
Several factors work in favour of Ukraine's ability to hold out. The enemy's economic base is an order of magnitude smaller than the combined resources of the Western coalition, provided the coalition is willing to spend them. Drone production and speed of adaptation remain an area where horizontal initiative confers a structural advantage. And most importantly, Ukraine's ‘stakes’, in Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler's terms, are extremely high. The war is being fought for survival rather than being an expeditionary one, and this sharply raises the threshold of tolerance for costs.
The arguments against are no less weighty. Demography is asymmetric: even a favourable loss ratio cannot compensate for the difference in mobilisation bases. The pattern identified by Bennett and Stam, according to which autocracies stay in wars longer, does not work in Kyiv's favour. And the shift to an asymmetric strategy announced by Syrskyi is, in essence, an admission that the exchange of attrition has ceased to be advantageous for Ukraine.
Here an uncomfortable symmetry should be noted. A state can hold on to its territory and still lose the war if, for the sake of survival, it dismantles the very things it was surviving for. A democracy that has curtailed accountability loses its advantages without acquiring the enemy's instruments. That is why, in a war of attrition, the question ‘can we win?’ is inseparable from the question ‘who will you be when you emerge from it?’.
The price of survival
Since 2022, Ukraine has, for understandable reasons, not become a more democratic country than it was before the war. Emergency powers are introduced as temporary, but a war of attrition has no clear ending: a ceasefire is not peace, and a line of contact is not a border. Consequently, there is no moment at which the regime of exceptions (to the constitution) is automatically lifted. It must be lifted by those who use it, voluntarily and against their own interest. South Korea is the canonical example here: a formally unfinished war served as the justification for authoritarian rule for thirty-five years after the shooting stopped. The danger lies not in individual wartime restrictions, each of which is justified on its own, but in the fact that taken together they have no built-in expiry date.
Closed procurement as a combat problem. Secrecy in defence procurement is operationally justified, but it also switches off the only effective mechanism for controlling price and quality. The difference between what is declared and what is received is measured here not in percentages of the budget but in shells missing from the positions. This is a case where an anti-corruption institution is neither a concession to external demands nor a peacetime luxury, but an element of firepower effectiveness. Moreover, this is precisely the area donors are most sensitive to: reputational damage translates into delays in aid packages faster than any event at the front.
Intolerance of criticism. The battlefield advantage of democracies described by Reiter and Stam consisted of initiative at the lower levels and the quality of command, and both depend on the right to report bad news without consequences for the person reporting it. As soon as internal criticism begins to be interpreted as the enemy's work, the system loses its feedback and acquires exactly the pathology that ruins closed armies. The command makes decisions based on an embellished picture and the situation on non-existent maps.
The lack of a party able to make peace. Postponed elections solve a short-term problem and create a long-term one. A war of attrition is ended by a signature, and a signature requires recognised legitimacy. The longer the renewal of the mandate is postponed, the narrower the space for acceptable compromises becomes: any territorial decision will be challenged as having been taken without authority. The paradox is that a government that has accumulated maximum formal powers during the war may prove politically incapable of signing what must be signed to end it.
A deferred problem: demobilisation. The return of hundreds of thousands of people with combat experience, trauma and weapons is a challenge in its own right, one that does not coincide with the end of the war but follows it with a delay. If by then civilian institutions are discredited and the army remains the only highly trusted structure, a classic praetorian configuration emerges: military authority as an alternative to political authority. Europe after 1918 produced a whole series of such transitions, and almost nowhere were they the result of anyone's design. Veterans' organisations simply turned out to be the only living form of solidarity in countries where politics had been discredited.
Demography is decided by trust, not by the front. Whether refugees return depends not on the line of defence but on whether there is something to return to in an institutional sense: whether the courts work, whether property is protected, whether the rules are predictable. A state that has defended its territory but failed to bring its people back loses the war of attrition retrospectively, in peacetime, because its demographic resource for the next crisis will be smaller and older.
There are also historical examples that need not be copied but deserve attention. Britain held a general election in 1945 without waiting for peace with Japan and replaced its wartime prime minister without harm to the outcome. Finland twice went through war with an incomparably stronger enemy, ceded a tenth of its territory and preserved its democracy. By the criterion of ‘who you were when you emerged’, this is perhaps the model of victory despite territorial defeat. Israel has fought wars without interrupting its electoral cycle. Military necessity, therefore, does not automatically require curtailing accountability. It merely creates a permanently available justification, which may be used or may not.
From this follows a practical test, applicable at the moment the war ends and independent of where the line runs:
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whether emergency powers will be lifted, and within what time frame;
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whether elections will be held, and whether the losing side will recognise their result;
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whether institutions capable of critically and impartially investigating the mistakes and miscalculations of one's own side will survive;
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whether a significant share of those who left will return;
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whether the military will stay out of politics.
The answers to these five questions determine the outcome of a war of attrition no less than the map does. Territory can be regained later; there are enough precedents. West Germany waited forty-five years and got what it wanted without firing a single shot, precisely because it had preserved a state that it made sense to join. A lost capacity for self-correction takes longer to restore, and sometimes it is never restored at all.
Sources
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Valerii Zaluzhnyi. Modern Positional Warfare and How to Win in It. Essay accompanying an interview with The Economist, November 2023: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/semon9-ryglx/2023-11-00-Zaluzhny-Modern-Positional-Warfare-and-How-to-Win-It-Economist-website.pdf
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Valerii Zaluzhnyi. Politics and War. Reality versus Expectations. LIGA.net, November 2025: https://www.ukrainianworldcongress.org/ua/valerii-zaluzhnyi-polityka-i-viina/
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Valerii Zaluzhnyi. Column for The Telegraph, July 2026: https://echofm.online/statya-dnya/the-telegraph-valerij-zaluzhnyj-ne-stoit-schitat-chto-rossiya-proigrala-vojnu
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Oleksandr Syrskyi at a meeting of the Ukraine–NATO Council, May 2025: https://nv.ua/ukraine/events/front-syrskiy-zayavil-chto-rossiyane-prodolzhayut-boevye-deystviya-nesmotrya-na-prizyvy-k-diplomatii-50514331.html
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Oleksandr Syrskyi on the shift to an asymmetric strategy, May 2026: https://gordonua.com/section-war/news-ukrayina-perekhodyt-do-asymetrychnoyi-stratehiyi-viyny-syrskyy-21-05-2026.html
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Dan Reiter, Allan C. Stam. Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42(3), 1998: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002798042003003
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Dan Reiter, Allan C. Stam. Democracies at War. Princeton University Press, 2002: https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691089492/democracies-at-war
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D. Scott Bennett, Allan C. Stam. The Declining Advantages of Democracy. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42(3), 1998: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002798042003007
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Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, Jason Reifler. Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq. International Security, 30(3), 2005/06: https://doi.org/10.1162/016228805775969573
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Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, Jason Reifler. Paying the Human Costs of War. Princeton University Press, 2009: https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691139081/paying-the-human-costs-of-war



